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Highlights

  • In recent years, there has been considerable scholarly and political attention to the worry that citizens of many democracies increasingly inhabit different “worlds”. This fear is acute in the US, where sharp polarisation between Democrats and Republicans is intense and seemingly ever-increasing, but it is also salient in many other Western countries where party-based identifications are swamped by other divisions, such as left versus right, cosmopolitan versus nationalist, establishment versus populist, and so on. (View Highlight)
  • Concretely, the worry is that on topics as diverse as election integrity, immigration, crime, vaccines, and the Epstein files, many citizens do not just hold different values and interests but operate with fundamentally different factual understandings of what is going on. (View Highlight)
  • This creates an obvious problem. Democracies can function if citizens have different experiences, interests, values, and ideologies, but if they can’t even agree on what is happening in the world, we are in trouble. (View Highlight)
  • As Obama said, “We want diversity of opinion; we don’t want diversity of facts.” (View Highlight)
  • This worry is typically coupled with a familiar partisan interpretation. For liberals and progressives like Obama, the fundamental problem is not so much that citizens inhabit distinct realities as that some citizens confront reality whilst others—the right, or at least the populist right—inhabit a fantasyland populated with fake news, misinformation, disinformation, demagogic lies, and conspiracy theories. (View Highlight)
  • For the right, this interpretation is reversed. As Rush Limbaugh declared in 2009, “Everything run, dominated and controlled by the left here and around the world is a lie. The other universe is where we are, and that’s where reality reigns supreme and we deal with it.” (View Highlight)
  • The suboptimal nature of this situation has fuelled much scholarship, discourse, and policy aimed at diagnosing what has gone wrong and prescribing various cures. (View Highlight)
  • However, a prior question is whether this assessment of substantial “factual polarisation” is accurate to begin with. How widespread is this phenomenon, really? How worried should we be? (View Highlight)
  • One source of scepticism is a now-familiar body of research alleging that post-2016 worries about fake news and misinformation are overblown. According to this work, clear-cut falsehoods and fabrications are less prevalent in the information environment than many assumed. (View Highlight)
  • More relevantly, there is also a persuasive body of research suggesting that estimates of factual misbelief and polarisation have been systematically overstated due to flawed survey designs. It turns out that when you pay respondents to give accurate answers (to guard against insincere partisan “cheerleading”), include “don’t know” options, and screen for inattention and trolling, the amount of outright factual errors and disagreements in public opinion tends to drop quite substantially. (View Highlight)
  • Finally, whereas five or ten years ago, it was all the rage among social scientists and public intellectuals to argue that people are so irrationally tribal they are often immune to facts and sometimes even “backfire” when confronted with corrections, such ideas have shared the fate of countless other sexy social-psychological findings: they generally haven’t replicated. The more robust, boring finding from recent research is that when people are presented with factual evidence and rational arguments, they tend to update their beliefs, even when that means moving away from their tribe’s orthodoxies. (View Highlight)
  • One reasonable lesson you might draw from all this is that the “different worlds” panic is unfounded. Perhaps most citizens are more closely tethered and responsive to a shared reality than was previously feared. They might still dislike members of other political tribes for dumb—well, tribal—reasons, as research on affective polarisation or political sectarianism suggests, but they don’t disagree about the fundamental nature of reality as much as many feared. (View Highlight)
  • I partly agree with this interpretation. The “different worlds” thesis has been overstated, even in highly divided countries like the US, especially among most normie voters who don’t pay much attention to politics because they have better/more enjoyable things to do. I also think that, as with the misinformation panic, too much of the discussion here has suffered from recency bias, exaggerating how novel the core phenomenon really is. (View Highlight)
  • Nevertheless, I think the core phenomenon is real and important for thinking about some of the central political challenges we confront today. However, much scholarship and discourse has misrepresented it. To understand in what sense citizens inhabit different worlds, we need to move away from differences over narrow, verifiable facts. Instead, the action resides in the competing systems of interpretation through which people select, categorise, frame, connect, explain, and narrate those facts. (View Highlight)
  • Although I am tedious in my repeated emphasis of this point, I think the best account of this phenomenon comes from one of my intellectual heroes, Walter Lippmann, in his analysis of what he called the “pseudo-environment”: the highly selective, low-resolution compressions of reality that most citizens confuse for reality itself. This analysis of the pseudo-environment spotlights a form of political division—of polarisation—that has been overlooked in much (but not all) scholarship: interpretive polarisation. (Neta Kligler-Vilenchik and colleagues call a similar phenomenon “interpretative polarization”.) (View Highlight)
  • Interpretive polarisation is not primarily disagreement over narrow, verifiable facts, nor disagreement over the values or high-level ideologies citizens bring to politics. It involves competing systems of interpretation that determine which facts citizens attend to, how they understand them, and how they connect their values and ideologies to political action. (View Highlight)
  • Part of my aim here is to make the case for this thesis. But I also want to argue that this analysis helps to illuminate some of the most pressing challenges liberal democracies confront today. (View Highlight)
  • For that, it will be helpful to start with one of the biggest stories in recent British politics: the murder of eighteen-year-old student Henry Nowak, and the processes through which the facts of his death were refracted through the rival systems of interpretation that organise political attention and conflict in the UK and broader Western world. (View Highlight)
  • This interpretation clashed with the mainstream liberal and progressive reading. Here, the events of Nowak’s murder and the police response were largely treated as an isolated tragedy, unrepresentative of, and so uninformative about, anything broader. Hence, they should not be “politicised” (i.e., treated as carrying information about matters of broad political interest). In contrast, the right’s reaction to such events was assimilated to a broader, more familiar template: far-right demagogues and deplorables exploiting unrepresentative tragedies to whip up hatred and division. (View Highlight)
  • In this narrative, the victims were the racial minorities targeted by such racist hatred, as well as the establishment institutions that function to protect them. (View Highlight)
  • In the aftermath of those events, the systems of interpretation that I have described were inverted. Among liberals and progressives, not just in the US but across the broader Western world, Floyd’s death was imbued with maximal political salience. It was not an isolated or unrepresentative murder and tragedy but the cause for a national reckoning—in fact, an international reckoning. (View Highlight)
  • The core narrative frame here was racism—not just Chauvin’s racism, but also the deeper, even more insidious forms of racism (structural, systemic, implicit) that had long poisoned Western cultures and institutions, which Floyd’s death was an awful symptom of. Of course, this causal interpretation implied a counterfactual assumption: that had Floyd been white, this would never have happened. (View Highlight)